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It has been said that fiducial inference as put forward by R.A. Fisher 
is not so much a theory as a collection of examples. A gradual evolution 
of ideas can be seen· in Fisher's published work, and he himself may 
have been less satisfied with his own theories than his writings would 
lead one to suspect. Joan Box (1978), p. 458, writes: 
"He continued to work at these problems but to the end 
of his days was not satisfied with the further solutions 
he.could arrive at •••••• He did not unravel the puzzle." 
In view of this and in view of the lack of any clear definition 
of what fiducial probability is, it is not surprising that the sub-
ject has been one of confusion and controversy ever since its intro-
duction in 1930. Wh!le interest in fiducial inference has declined 
since Fisher's death in 1962, there continue to.be efforts to clarify 
and extend his ideas. See for example Fraser (1961a, b, 1966, 1968, 
1976, 1979), Hacking (1965), Williams (1966), Verhagen (1966), 
Wilkinson (1977), Pedersen (1978). 
Several key ideas can be illustrated by the case of a single 
observation x from a normal distribution with mean µ and unit vari-
ance, for which we use the standard notation x - N(µ,l). If we put 
z = x - µ then z - N(0,1). A quantity like z which depends on the 
observation x and the parameter µ, and whose distribution is free 
of the parameter is called a pivotal quantity or pivot. The fiducial 
argument consists in writing µ = x - z and asserting that when we 
have no knowledge about µ except the value x, then our uncertainty 
about µ is summarized by saying µ equals x minus an unknown value 
of a standard normal random variable. In short µ --N(x,l). This is 
called the fiducial distribution of µ. The values x ± 1.96 include 
1 
all but five percent of the distribution and so would be called 95 
percent fiducial limits for µ. 
Sometimes the objection is raised that µ is not a random variable, 
but a fixed unknown number. Consider however that a coin which has 
already fallen heads or tails has achieved a fixed outcome, but until 
we actually view it, our uncertainty about it for any purpose of action 
or decision is represented probabilistically by P(heads) = P(tails) = 1/2. 
If indeed the previously mentioned trial were repeated indefinitely 
with arbitrarily varying µ values to give (µ1 ,x1), (µ2,x2),···, and 
if the µ values were subsequently revealed and plotted on a scale 
relative to a fixed point x in such a way that µi - x equals the 
actual i-th difference µ. - x. , then the plotted values would follow 
]. ]. 
a normal distribution centered at x, that is, a N(x,1) distribution, 
the fiducial distribution. Thus in the absence of a priori information, 
our knowledge (or uncertainty) about µ1 say, given ~, is sUlllliled up 
by stating that if its value were revealed, it would appear to be a 
random value from N(x1 ,l). 
1. Relationship to Bayesian inference. 
If f(x,8) is the assumed probability law of data x and 7T(6) 
is a prior density then Bayes Theorem yields the posterior density 
n(8lx) =7T(8)f(x,6) / J1T(9)f(x,9)d8. In using the term "inverse probability" 
Fisher (1930) referred to the practice of taking 7T(9) to be constant 
in order to represent prior ignorance (Bayes' postulate). Pointing out 
that this procedure was inconsistent under transformations of 9, Fisher 
put forward his own likelihood theory and fiducial theory to avoid the 
objectionable postulate. 
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In more recent times there has been a tendency to regard the prior 
density ~(9) as a representation of subjective belief. This view 
was equally distasteful to Fisher, whose constant goal was an objective 
theory uncontaminated by subjective elements. 
2. Relationship to confidence intervals. 
Like fiducial theory, Neyman's theory of confidence limits leads to 
probability statements about the value of 
prior density. Random intervals I(x) of 
a without appealing to any 
8 values are confidence 
intervals with confidence level y if Pr[8 E I(x)IS] = y for all 9 • 
As we indicate later, in many examples there is a formal correspondence 
between the two theories in that the fiducial probability of the con-
fidence interval equals the confidence level. Whether or not the two 
theories give different numerical results, there are differences in 
their aims and interpretations. 
(i) In confidence interval theory, a is considered a fixed constant 
and the interval is considered random. In fiducial theory, x is 
considered fixed and a random, or perhaps more accurately, uncertain. 
(ii) Confidence intervals are admittedly nonunique. In Fisher's 
view it was a fatal defect that different solutions could assign dif-
ferent confidence levels to a single interval. Uniqueness of fiducial 
distributions was consistently maintained by Fisher but disputed by 
others. Concepts like sufficiency and Fisher information presumably 
furnish the keys to uniqueness. 
(iii) Fiducial theory yields, through the integral of the density, 
the fiducial probability of any interval, whereas confidence intervals 
only assign confidence y to the particular interval I(x). This dis-
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tinction does tend to disappear however if we require a solution for 
every O < y < 1 rather than only for one fixed value such as y = 0.95. 
3. Estimating a single parameter. 
Let x be either a single observation or a sufficient statistic 
with a CDF F(x,6) such that aF/ae is negative. Then the contours 
of F in the (9,x) plane slope upward to the right. Consider the con-
tours F = 0.1, 0.2,•••,0.9 which divide the (0,x) plane·.into ten 
regions. For any fixed e, the random value of x has equal probability 
of falling in each region. If x is fixed, then the set of all 6 values 
is divided into ten intervals. From the fiducial point of view, each 
of these intervals has fiducial probability (given x) of 0.1. From 
the confidence interval point of view, the 6 values in say any k 
contiguous intervals would constitute a confidence interval with confidence 
coefficient 0.1 k. By refining the subdivision of F values we are 
led to the expression 
(1) ~(6lx) = -oF(x,9)/ae 
for the fiducial density of 9 given x, a formula given by Fisher (1930) 
when first introducing fiducial probability, and given again in (1956), 
p. 70. Fisher's 1930 explanation emphasized frequencies and hardly 
differs from a description of confidence intervals. Only later when the 
theories were extended to more complex models did differences become 
apparent. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for -aF/ae to be a posterior 
distribution for some prior ·are given by Lindley (1958): There exist 
transformations of x to u and 6 to T such that T is a location 
parameter for u. The prior on T must then be uniform, and if regularity 
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conditions require - 00 < L < 00 , only an improper prior distribution 
is capable of yielding a posterior density identical with the fiducial 
density. 
To derive (1) by a pivotal argument, let u = F(x,0). The trans-
formation from x to u with e fixed yielas the uniform density 
g(u) = 1 (0 < u < 1), and thus u = F(x,0) is a pivot (Fisher (1935), 
p. 395). The transformation from u to 8 with x fixed gives 
~(Six)= g(u)lau/ael = -aF/ae, the fiducial density. 
When 8 is a location parameter for x, then F(x,0) has the 
form H(x-8) and the fiducial density is ~(Six)= h(x-8) where 
h(u) = d H(u)/du. In this case the graphs of f(x,6) and ~(Six) 
are mirror images. 
4. Joint pivots 
For problems involving two or more parameters there are several 
methods for deriving fiducial distributions, and it is not surprising 
to encounter difficulties in establishing unique solutions. For example 
one might use either joint pivots or a combination of conditional and 
marginal pivots. 
and 
If ui = u1 (x1 ,x2,e1 ,e2) (i = 1,2) where 
e1 ,e2 are parameters and if the density 
x1 ,x2 are statistics 
g(ul,u2) = f(xl,x2;81,82) IJxul 
(Jxu is the Jacobian of the transformation with fixed 61 ,e2) does not 
depend on 
to 
61 ,e2, then u1 ,u2 are joint pivots. 
e1 ,e2 with x1 ,x2 fixed gives 
Transforming from 
which is the joint fiducial distribution of e1 ,a2 , at least if we have 
chosen legitimate pivots. Fisher (1956), p. 172, cautions agains_t an 
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arbitrary choice of pivots but provides no comprehensive rules. 
earlier discussion (1935), p. 395, ignored consistency problems. 
An 
Any fiducial distribution obtained from joint pivots is consistent 
with a confidence region interpretation by the following argument. Let 
R be any region in the u1 ,u2 · plane with Pr[R] = y, and let S(x1 ,x2) 
be the image of R in the 01 ,02 plane depending on fixed observed 
values x1 ,x2 . Then S(x1 ,x2) is a confidence region with confidence 
level y, that is Pr[(01 ,02) E S(X1,x2)je1 ,e2] = Pr[R] = y, and 




One of the best known fiducial distribution is that of the normal 
µ when the population variance cr2 is also unknown. If x 
denotes the mean of a sample of size n, and 2 -1 - 2 s = (n-1) E(x.-x) , 
1 
then the quantity t = v'n (i-µ)/s is known to have Student's distribution. 
In first presenting this example in 1935 Fisher wrote: 
"It must now be noticed that t is a continuous function of the 
unknown parameter, the mean, together with observable values, 
x, sand n, only. Consequently the inequality t > t 1 is 
equivalent to the inequality µ < x-stl/ rn, so that this 
last inequality must be satisfied with the same probability as 
the first. This probability is known for all values of t 1 , 
and decreases continuously as t 1 is increased. Since, there-
fore, the right-hand side of the inequality takes, by varying 
t 1 , all real values, we may state the probability that µ is 
less than any assigned value, or the probability that it lies 
between any assigned values, or, in short, its probability dis-
tribution, in the light of the sample observed." 
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Thus by the pivotal or fiducial argument, the fiducial distribution 
of µ is the distribution of x - st/In. where x and s are fixed 
at their observed values and t has Student's distribution. 
The Student example is notable in that all routes seem to converge 
on a single answer. The fiducial limits are of course identical to the 
confidence limits found in virtually every statistics textbook. More-
over the British astronomer Jeffreys using the prior dµdcr/cr (which 
he favored for reasons of invariance), noted (1948), pp. 122, 352, the 
correspondence of the fiducial and posterior distributions. In addition 
we may note some consistent variants of the fiducial method: 
(i) Use joint pivots (t,u) with u = s/cr and get the marginal 
density of µ from the joint density of µ and cr. (ii) Use u to 
get the marginal density of cr from the marginal density of s, then 
multiply ~his by the conditional density of µ given cr obtained from 
the pivot x - µ conditional on a. (Fisher (1956), page 119, calls 
this the "rigorous" way.) (iii) Use the Fisher-Pitman theory of location 
and scale parameters discussed below. (iv) Obtain the fiducial dis-
tribution of the mean and variance of a future sample of size --n and 
let 
--
n tend to infinity (Fisher (1935), (1956), p. 119). 
6. Behrens' distribution 
The estimation of the difference of normal means o = µ1-µ 2 when 
the variances are not assumed equal is known as the Behrens-Fisher problem. 
It is of historical interest as an early example in which fiducial 
limits are not confidence limits. No entirely satisfactory confidence 
interval solution is available, and the merits of the Behrens-Fisher 
solution and its competitors continue to be debated. 
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In an obvious extension of the notation of the previous section 
we can write 
From this Fisher (1935) argued that o is fiducially distributed like 
a constant, i 1-x2 , plus a variable equal to a weighted sum of two inde-
pendent Student variables (a Behrens distribution). While the exact 
coverage probability of the resulting fiducial intervals cannot exactly 
equal the corresponding fiducial probability (see for example Kendall 
and Stuart (1961), page 149), numerical evidence indicates the procedure 
is conservative (see Robinson (1976) and also footnote 28 (by John Pratt) 
to Savage (1976)). 
The fiducial distribution of o is known to equal a posterior 
7. Ancillary statistics 
An ancillary statistic is one whose distribution does not depend 
on the parameter. For example with a sample of size n from a location 
family f(x-8) the vector y of n-1 spacings of the ordered observa-
tions has a distribution which is free of e. The statistic y has 
the curious property that by itself it contains no information about 8, 
A 
but when used in conjunction with the maximum likelihood estimator 0, 
it carries information about the precision of 8. Fisher called the 
spacings the "complexion" of the sample and argued that inference should 
be made conditionally on the observed value of y. For any fixed y, 
6-6 is a pivot, and a conditional pivotal argument gives a fiducial 
n 
density proportional to the likelihood function: ~(8lx1 , ••• ,xn) a: 1T f (x. -6). i=l ]. 
8 
• 
A forceful if artificial example in which the conditional treatment 
makes sense is furnished by case of two observations from a uniform 
distribution with mean e and unit range. If and denote 
the smaller and larger observations respectively, then the possible 
values of a are x( 2) - 1/2 ~ 8 ~ x(l) + 1/2, and the fiducial dis-
tribution is uniform over this range. The unconditional pivot x - 0 
would not give a legitimate fiducial distribution because x is not 
sufficient; nevertheless it would yield confidence intervals. Symmetric 
limits, x ± c, have the seemingly objectionable property of covering 0 
with certainty for large enough values of the ancillary statistic x( 2)- x(l). 
Logical problems associated with ancillary statistics are not fully 
settled. Even if it is granted that inference should be conditional 
on an ancillary statistic, the problem of showing existence or nonexistence 
of ancillaries remains unsolved. Fisher (1936), (1956), p. 118, termed 
this the "problem of the Nile," likening the partition of the sample 
space to the partitioning of land of a Nile village in such a way that 
the yields of the lots would be in predetermined proportion whatever 
the height of the flood. Here height of flood corresponds to 8 and 
lot boundaries to contours of the ancillary statistic. 
8. Location and scale models 
For a sample of size n from a location-scale model -1 cr f ((x-0) / a) , 
the n-2 quotients of the n-1 spacings of the ordered observations 
are distributed independently of (9,cr) and so are jointly ancillary. 
Conditional joint pivots can be found which yield the Fisher-Pitman 
fiducial distribution 
n 
TI f ((x. -0) /cr) 
i=l l. 
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Fisher (1934) gave likelihood theory relevant to this model, but the 
fiducial distribution was first given explicitly by Pitman (1939). The 
example is discussed again in Fisher (1956), pp. 159-163. The fiducial 
distribution is evidently equivalent to a posterior distribution cor-
responding to the improper prior d9dcr/o, and it is known that marginal 
distributions of e and a can be used to obtain confidence intervals. 
By transformation the results can be applied to distributions not 
initially in location-scale form, such as the Weibull (Lawless, 1978). 
9. Difficulties 
The following examples, paradoxical in varying degrees, show why 
circumspection is needed in interpretations and manipulations of fiducial 
probability. 
If x - N(6,1), the fiducial density of e2 derived from e ~ N(x,1) 
is dif~erent from that derived from the density of 2 X • 
Tukey (1957) has shown that different pairs of joint pivots can 
lead to different fiducial distributions. 
Lindley (1958) considered two observations from 
f(x,0) = e2 (x+l)e-ex/(0+1) (x > 0) and showed that the fiducial dis-
tribution ~(0lx1,x2) is not equal to the posterior distribution of 
8 given x2 when the prior is taken to equal the fiducial distribution 
~(SI~). If the fiducial distribution is to be interpreted like a prior 
distribution, as one might infer for example from Fisher (1956), p. 125, 
then one would have expected equality. A related fact is that ~(8lx1) 
is not a posterior density for any prior. 
Stein (1959) obtained the marginal fiducial distribution of 






where x. - N(S.,1), and showed that there could be arbitrarily large 
l. l. 
discrepancies between the resulting fiducial probabilities and confidence 
levels arrived at by using the statistic r~ xi2 • 
In the estimation of µ2/µ1 given a sample from a bivariate normal 
population, Creasy (1954) and Fieller (1954) obtained different solutions 
by using different pivots (the "Creasy-Fieller paradox"). 
Given from N(µ,cr) 
has fiducial probability 0.5, but in the subset of cases where 
3jx1-x2 1 > 2lx1+x2 1 the conditional probability exceeds 0.518 for 
all µ,cr (Buehler and Feddersen (1963)). Brown (1967) gives generaliza-
tions; Yates (1964) defends Fisher's theory. 
10. Invariance 
Many standard parametric models have the following invariance 
property: If x has a distribution in the given family, so does gx, 
where g is an element of a transformation group G, and there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the elements g of G and the para-
meter values a. Fraser (1961 a,b) attempted to set up a rigorous 
mathematical framework for fiducial theory for such models, and his 
later theory of structural inference (1968) is a continuation of this 
work. In these models the orbit of any point x is the set of all 
gx with g ranging over G. The orbit label turns out to be an ancillary 
statistic, and by using a pivotal argument conditional on the ancillary 
one obtains a fiducial distribution which equals the posterior distri-
bution when the prior measure equals the right Haar measure on G. The 
Haar measure is improper in the most familiar examples, but not for 
distributions on the circle or sphere (Fraser, 1979). 
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If $(0) is a real-valued function of a vector parameter 0, then 
a sufficient condition for fiducial limits for $ , obtained from its mar-
ginal distribution, to be confidence limits is the following: $(01) = 
W(02) implies $(g01) = $(g02) for all g (Hora and Buehler, 1966). 
Further discussion of these invariant models is found in Zacks (1971), 
Sections 7.2., 7.3. 
11. Further reading. 
In view of the unresolved difficulties, it is understandable that 
textbook authors tend to shy away from fiducial theory. The fiducial 
advocate Quenouille (1958) is one exception. The less partisan writers 
Kendall and Stuart (1961) describe their approach like this (p. 152): 
"There has been so much controversy about the various methods 
of estimation we have described that, at this point, we shall 
have to leave our customary objective standpoint and descend 
into the arena ourselves." 
Savage (1976), p. 467, gives a list of all examples of fiducial 
distributions in Fisher's published work. Fairly extensive bibliographies 
are given by Brillinger (1962), Savage (1976) and Pedersen (1978). 
Fisher (1956) (or better, the third edition dated 1973) is the most au-
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